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Abstract
Due to a shortage of data and increased international mergers, national energy regulators are
looking to international benchmarking analyses for help in setting price controls within
incentive regulation. We present an international benchmarking study of 63 regional electricity
distribution utilities in 6 European countries that aims to illustrate the methodological and data
issues encountered in the use of international benchmarking for utility regulation. The study
examines the effect of the choice of benchmarking methods using DEA, COLS and SFA
models. We discuss what problems of international benchmarking are highlighted by the study
and how they can be overcome.
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11. Introduction
Electricity sector reforms are transforming the structure and operating environment
of the electricity industries across many countries. The central aims of these reforms
are to introduce market-oriented measures in electricity generation and supply, and
improve the efficiency of the natural monopoly activities of distribution and
transmission through regulatory reforms. This paper is concerned with this latter
aspect of the reforms.
Recent regulatory reforms have tended to move away from traditional rate-of-return
regulation towards incentive-based regulation models.1 A number of regulators have
adopted price and revenue cap regulation based on the RPI-X formula. A central
issue is how the efficiency requirements or X-factors are to be set. A widely
favoured approach is through benchmarking of utilities based on their relative
efficiency. Countries such as The Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Norway have
adopted benchmarking as part of the process of setting the X-factors. Benchmarking
identifies the most efficient firms in the sector and measures the relative
performance of less efficient firms against these. Individual X-factors are then
assigned to utilities based on their relative inefficiency. Generally, the more
inefficient a utility is, the higher is the X-factor assigned to that firm. The aim is to
provide the firms with an incentive to close their efficiency gap with the frontier
firms.
2However, the number of utilities in many countries is limited and does not lend itself
to the data requirements of some of the widely used benchmarking techniques. Also,
due to electricity market liberalisation and privatisation policies, power markets and
ownership of the utilities are becoming increasingly international, and mergers and
acquisitions tend to reduce the domestic information base. Regulators can use cross-
country benchmarking in order to evaluate the performance of national utilities
within the larger context of international practice. The addition of international
comparators to a sample can improve the validity of the analysis as utilities are more
likely to be benchmarked against similar firms. Further, international comparisons
enable the regulators to measure efficiency of the utilities relative to international
best practice. The advantage of using international best practice is that the measured
efficiencies are more likely to reflect technical possibilities rather than the degree of
comprehensiveness of the sample used.
While international utility benchmarking has clear advantages, the methodological
and practical aspects, as well as possible implications of this approach, need careful
consideration. Empirical studies can be a useful instrument to identify and shed light
on some of the main issues arising in international benchmarking. There are a
number of single-country and a few cross-country studies of relative efficiency of
electricity distribution utilities. However, most of these either do not have an explicit
3regulatory focus or use physical measures of inputs as proxies for the operating and
capital costs.
Benchmarking with the use of physical quantities of inputs measures the potential
for efficiency improvements in terms of reductions in physical units. However, the
primary aim of regulators when using benchmarking is to promote cost savings in
the utilities that result in lower prices for the end-users. Relative performance
measured in terms of units of physical inputs bears an indirect relationship with cost
savings potential as the basis for setting X-factors.
It should be noted that this study uses an empirical analysis of selected electricity
distribution utilities to highlight and discuss the main issues in international
benchmarking and the results have not been intended for direct use in an actual
regulatory process. In this paper we examine some methodological and applied
aspects of cost-based international benchmarking in electric utility regulation. We
apply the widely used benchmarking techniques of Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA), Corrected Ordinary Least Square (COLS), and Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA) to an international sample of utilities and compare the results. We then
examine the significance of the choice of method for currency conversion for the
DEA results. We also compare the DEA results with a model specification that uses
measures of physical units as a proxy for capital costs. We finally outline the
4regulatory implications of international benchmarking and draw some conclusions.
2. Benchmarking Techniques2
There are several different approaches to the measurement of the relative efficiency
of firms in relation to an efficient frontier of a sample. These approaches can be
placed into two broad categories of programming (non-parametric) or statistical
(parametric) techniques. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a programming
approach, while Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) and Stochastic Frontier
Analysis (SFA) are statistical techniques. We use these three techniques in this study
and discuss them in this section.
2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
DEA is a non-parametric method and uses piecewise linear programming to
calculate (rather than estimate) the efficient or best-practice frontier of a sample (see
Farrell 1957; Färe et al. 1985). The decision-making units (DMUs) or firms that
make up the frontier envelop the less efficient firms. The efficiency of the firms is
calculated in terms of scores on a scale of 0 to 1, with the frontier firms receiving a
5score of 1. DEA can calculate the allocative and technical efficiency of the firms.
The latter can be decomposed into scale, congestion, and pure technical inefficiency.
DEA models can be input and output oriented and can be specified as constant
returns to scale (CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS). Output-oriented models
maximise output for a given amount of input factors. Conversely, input-oriented
models minimise input factors required for a given level of output. An input-oriented
specification is generally regarded as the appropriate from for electricity distribution
utilities, as demand for distribution services is a derived demand beyond the control
of utilities that has to be met.
The linear program calculating the efficiency score of the i-th firm in a sample of N
firms in CRS models takes the form specified in Equation (1) where θ is a scalar
(equal to the efficiency score) and λ represents an N×1 vector of constants.
Assuming that the firms use E inputs and M outputs, X and Y represent E×N input
and M×N output matrices respectively. The input and output column vectors for the
i-th firm are represented by xi and yi respectively. The equation is solved once for
each firm. In VRS models a convexity constraint Σλ=1 is added. This additional
constraint ensures that the firm is compared against other firms with similar size.
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In equation (1) firm i is compared to a linear combination of sample firms which
produce at least as much of each output as it does and the minimum possible amount
of inputs. Figure 1 illustrates the main features of an input-oriented model with
constant returns to scale. The figure shows three firms (G, H, R) that use two inputs
(capital K, labour L) for a given output Y. The vertical and horizontal axis represent
the capital and labour input per unit of output respectively and the line PP shows the
relative price of the two inputs.
[Figure 1 here]
Firms G and H produce the given output with less inputs and form the efficient
frontier that envelops the less efficient firm R. The technical and allocative
efficiencies of firm R relative to the frontier can be calculated from OJ/OR and
OM/OJ ratios respectively. Technical efficiency measures the ability of a firm to
minimise inputs to produce a given level of outputs. Allocative efficiency reflects
the ability of the firm to optimise the use of inputs given the price of the inputs. The
overall efficiency of firm R is measured from OM/OR.
7A central step in DEA is the choice of appropriate input and output variables. The
variables should, as far as possible, reflect the main aspects of resource-use in the
activity concerned. DEA can also account for factors that are beyond the control of
the firms and can affect their performance (environmental variables).
An advantage of DEA is that inefficient firms are compared to actual firms rather
than some statistical measure. In addition, DEA does not require specification of a
cost or production function. However, the efficiency scores tend to be sensitive to
the choice of input and output variables. Also, the method does not allow for
stochastic factors and measurement errors. Further, as more variables are included in
the models, the number of firms on the frontier increases. Therefore, it is important
to examine the sensitivity of the efficiency scores and rank order of the firms to
model specification.
2.2 Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS)
An alternative frontier-oriented approach to measure relative efficiency of firms is to
use statistical methods to ‘estimate’ the best practice frontier and efficiency scores.
COLS is one such method based on regression analysis (Richmond, 1974). Similar
to DEA, the method estimates the efficiency scores of the firms on a 0 to 1 scale.
The regression equation is estimated using the OLS technique and then shifted to the
8efficient frontier by adding the absolute value of the largest negative estimated error
to that of the other errors (for a cost function).
The COLS method requires specification of a cost or production function and
therefore involves assumptions about technological properties of the firms’
production process. A drawback of the method is that the estimated parameters may
not make engineering sense. In addition, the method makes no allowance for
stochastic errors and relies heavily on the position of the single most efficient firm.
Similar to DEA, COLS assumes that all deviations from the frontier are due to
inefficiency.
The COLS technique can be used to calculate efficiency scores of models involving
multiple inputs and outputs by estimating distance functions. Following Coelli and
Perleman (1999) and Coelli, Rap et al. (1998), Equation (2) show a translog input
distance function.3 DIi is the input-oriented distance for the i-th firm in a sample of N
firms with K inputs and M outputs and where α, β, and δ are unknown parameters.
The function is homogeneous of degree +1 in inputs. Inputs and outputs are denoted
x and y respectively and x*k=xk/xK. Equation (2) can rewritten as in (3) where TL is
the translog function in (2) and “–Ln(DIi)” is an unobservable term interpreted as the
random error term µi.
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The function in Equation (3) is estimated using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
technique. The estimated constant term of the function is then adjusted by
subtracting the value of the largest positive residual from those of all units. This
transformation ensures that the function passes through the most efficient unit and
bounds the other units. The distance measures for the inefficient units are then
calculated as the exponential of their corrected residuals.
2.3 Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
SFA is another parametric method used to estimate the efficient frontier and
efficiency scores. The statistical nature of the method allows for inclusion of
stochastic errors in the analysis and testing of hypotheses. Similar to COLS, this
method requires specification of a cost or production function involving assumptions
about the firms’ production technologies. Estimation of efficiency scores in SFA is
10
similar to that of COLS. In addition, SFA recognises the possibility of stochastic
errors (see Coelli, Rap et al., 1998).
The notation of an input-oriented distance function for multiple input and output
models is similar to that described for COLS. However, when applying SFA a
symmetric error term ν is added to the random error term µ to account for noise.
SFA reduces reliance on measurements of a single efficient firm. However,
accounting for stochastic errors requires specification of a probability function for
the distribution of the errors and distribution of inefficiencies (e.g. half normal). As
for the result of stochastic factors and their effect on the position of the most
efficient firm, the estimated scores are higher than those estimated by COLS. Figure
2 illustrates a COLS model with a single cost input C and one output Y.
[Figure 2 here]
The cost equation COLS .f1(Y) is estimated using OLS regression and then shifted
by CA to CCOLS .&$I1(Y) on which the most efficient firm A lies. The
efficiency score for an inefficient firm B is calculated as EF/BF. The figure also
shows the estimated cost equation CSFA=f2(Y) using SFA. A firm, such as A, which
lies below the stochastic frontier might be regarded as 100% efficient, i.e. the
difference between its actual costs and its expected costs on the frontier are effected
by a negative cost shock. A drawback of the method is that even if there are no
11
errors in efficiency measurements, some inefficiency may be wrongly regarded as
noise.
3. Data
The benchmarking study reported here is based on data on 63 electricity distribution
and regional transmission utilities in Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
and United Kingdom. The data used in the study is collected by the regulators in the
relevant countries for the purpose of an international benchmarking exercise. Table
1 shows the number of utilities included in the study from each country. As shown
in the table, the number of utilities varies across the countries and in most of these it
is not large enough for identifying broad-based production possibilities using
benchmarking techniques.4 Table 2 shows the variables and summary statistics of
data used.
[Table 1 here]
[Table 2 here]
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3.1 Cost data
As mentioned previously, this study uses monetary values of the input variables and
differs from many of the previous studies where inputs are expressed in physical
units. This is particularly advantageous from a regulatory point of view, as monetary
values of the inputs can reflect all operating and capital inputs and measure the
relative cost efficiency of utilities. In addition, expression of different inputs in a
single measure recognises the possible trade-offs among these. This section presents
adjustment of the cost data to a common reference year and their subsequent
conversion into a single monetary unit.
3.1.1 Harmonisation and adjustment of costs
The task of standardisation of cost data for this study has was carried out by the
participating regulators. The controllable operating costs used in the benchmarking
of the utilities were derived from company law accounts adjusted for: (i) cost of
sales, (ii) transmission system exit charge, (iii) income or federal taxes paid to local
governments, (iv) licence fees, (v) depreciation and amortisation of tangible fixed
assets, and (vi) federal and state employers taxes.
13
The capital expenditures data used in this study represent new investments in one
year and exclude capital stocks and depreciation. A shortcoming of using annual
capital expenditures is that these may not reflect the value of capital stocks. The
problem can, due to the cyclical nature of investments in distribution utilities, be
more profound when the scope of analysis is limited to one year as unusually large
(small) investments by a utility in that year may under (over) estimate its efficiency.
The choice of annual capital expenditures has largely been dictated by availability of
comparable data across different countries.
As noted previously, the main focus of this study is on methodological issues of
international benchmarking. An alternative approach would be to use the value of
the capital stocks and work out the rental cost of the capital. However, capital stocks
have long economic lives and difficulties involved in accounting for factors such as
inflation, assets depreciation, and currency fluctuations over many years for several
countries would reduce the accuracy of measurements.
The cost data collected for this study refer to different years. Table 3 shows the
years for which data from participating countries was available. In order to establish
a common time reference for the cost data these were adjusted to mid-1999 levels
using the OECD statistics on quarterly Consumer Price Index (CPI) changes. The
adjustments resulted in minor changes to cost data. Table 3 shows the percentage
change to cost data to bring these to the level of the reference year.
14
[Table 3 here]
3.1.2 Currency conversions
An important step in cross-country comparisons is how to convert the cost data
expressed in national currencies into a single monetary unit. A commonly used
approach is to convert the costs using the Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) of
currencies. The PPPs equalise the differences in the price levels in different
countries and measure the purchasing power of the currencies in relation to a certain
basket of goods. The conventional exchange rates, however, do not account for these
differences.
As the currency exchange rates often differ from the PPPs, the choice of conversion
method affects the relative costs to be compared. The extent of this effect depends
on the countries that comprise the sample. The significance of the conversion
method may vary with the type of cost inputs. For example, with regards to
operating costs, the PPPs may appear as the appropriate measure as they are largely
incurred in local currencies and affected by domestic price levels. Capital costs
include purchase of large amounts of materials and equipment traded in the
international markets and settled in foreign currencies.
15
The operating and capital costs used in this study were converted into a single
monetary unit using the PPPs of the currencies against the US dollar. The choice of
the reference currency for the PPPs is, however, arbitrary and the conversion can use
the PPPs against any currency without affecting relative cost differences among the
utilities. Table 4 shows US dollar based PPPs for the relevant currencies in 1999.
[Table 4 here]
3.2 Technical data
As noted in the previous section, cost data definitions can be harmonised and
different currencies can be converted into a single unit for currency differences.
Another factor that complicates international efficiency comparisons is that technical
standards and definitions of transmission and distribution systems vary across the
countries. These differences can have implications for the level of capital stock and
operating expenditures of utilities and influence the benchmarking results. In
particular, the voltage levels of the cut-off points between the transmission and
distribution functions of networks differ across the countries. At the same time, it is
difficult to determine the direction and extent of cost implications of these
differences for the utilities.
16
However, given sufficient data, it is possible to attempt to account for technical
differences by using categorical variables representing different voltage levels or,
given the data, separation of sub-functions (e.g. low or high voltage) of utilities.
Table 5 shows the differences in the voltage levels of the transmission and
distribution networks across the countries. The maximum voltage level of
distribution utilities in this study range from 22 and 132 kV for the Norwegian
distribution and regional transmission utilities to 132 kV for the RECs in England
and Wales.
[Table 5 here]
3.3 Preferred models
This study uses the frontier-oriented benchmarking techniques DEA, COLS, and
SFA described in the previous section. The data available for this study give the
framework within which important features of the operation of distribution utilities
can be modelled. The data on electricity distribution utilities can be used in various
combinations and model specifications. For comparison of the results of different
techniques, it is desirable that the models include similar variables. In this paper we
report the results form ten models, six DEA, two COLS, and two SFA models. An
17
overview of the preferred models for this study, the methods used, and the input and
output variables are given in Table 6.
[Table 6 here]
In DEA the number of frontier firms tends to increase with addition of variables to
the models. In particular, when the sample size is not large, this results in loss of
information. There is therefore a trade-off between capturing the main aspects of the
utilities’ operation and revealing the performance variations among the firms. Our
base model DEA-1CRS comprises the total units of electricity delivered, number of
customers, and network length as the outputs. These variables are among the most
important cost drivers and are frequently used in efficiency studies of electricity
distribution and transmission utilities. A summary of the inputs and outputs used in
20 benchmarking studies of electricity distribution utilities outlined in Jamasb and
Pollitt (2001) shows that our outputs are among the most frequently used variables
(Table 7).
[Table 7 here]
Some authors such as Neuberg (1977) have suggested that only traded outputs can
be regarded as outputs. However, inclusion of the ‘number of customers’ reflects the
spread of demand among the connection points that is generally regarded as a major
18
cost driver. This variable also captures the important differences in average
consumption levels as well as between the regional transmission and distribution
utilities both of which types are included in the sample. Also, the ‘size of the
network’ reflects the geographical dispersion of the output and the scope of
operation. These variables are used by OFGEM to derive a composite measure of
output (number of customers 50%, units distributed 25%, and network length 25%)
in a COLS-type analysis of the operating costs of the distribution utilities in England
and Wales (see OFGEM, 1999).
The total costs of the utilities were used as the only input variable. Subsequent
model runs showed that the efficiency scores obtained when splitting the number of
customers into residential and non-residential users, have a high correlation with
those from the initial model. A similar result was also obtained when output variable
network length was divided into overhead and underground cables. We then split the
total costs into separate operating and capital cost variables and the efficiency
scores' correlation with the initial model remained high. We therefore retain the
initial model as one of preferred models. DEA-1VRS is a VRS specification of the
base model.
In DEA-2CRS model we use the controllable operating expenditures together with
T&D losses and network length (as proxy for capital stocks) as input variables.
These variables are often used as inputs in DEA models of distribution utilities. The
19
model specifies the network length and T&D losses as non-discretionary variables.
This means that the distance of variable to the frontier does not affect the efficiency
scores of the firms. This specification assumes that these technical characteristics of
the network lie outside management control and can be regard as given. This
assumption is suitable for this study as the T&D of some of the utilities in the
sample are derived from standard rates rather than their actual losses.
The DEA-2VRS model is the VRS version of DEA-2CRS and all input variables are
by definition discretionary. DEA-1E model uses a similar specification as DEA-
1CRS while total expenditures are converted into Euro (1999-rates). DEA-1OP uses
operating expenditures as the only input while output variables are similar to DEA-
1CRS.
In addition, the loglinear and translog specifications of the initial DEA model (DEA-
1CRS) are calculated using COLS, and SFA techniques. The specification of
loglinear and translog models used with COLS and SFA methods are shown in
Equations 4 and 5 respectively.
Loglinear model specification:
νββββ ++++
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           (4)
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where:
TOTEX total expenditures UNIT units of electricity delivered
CUST total number of customers NETW network length
ν error term (in SFA models)
It should be noted that loglinear specification assumes constant elasticity of
substitution among output variables. Translog specification is a generalised form of
loglinear that is more flexible and allows for variations in elasticity of substitution
among inputs. However, due to this flexibility, translog models they may not always
produce statistically significant results for all samples. In particular, parameter
values may be meaningless when the scale of the firms included in the sample
covers a rather wide range (see for example Coelli, Rap and Battese, 1998, pp.52-53,
and Coelli and Perelman, 1996, p.19).
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4. Results
This section presents the results of the selected models outlined in Table 6. The
results from the base model DEA-1CRS are discussed in some detail. The results
from the other models are then presented in less detail as these can be regarded as
derivatives of the base model. The efficiency scores of the utilities with different
models and summary statistics of the efficiency scores are shown in are summarised
in Tables 8 and 9 respectively.5 Tables 10 and 11 show the simple and rank
correlation of the efficiency scores respectively for the eight selected models. A high
correlation among the scores reflects high consistency of the rankings when the
variables, model specifications, or methods used change.
4.1 DEA models
As shown in the table, in the DEA-1CRS model, three utilities have efficiency
scores of 100% and dominate the frontier. Utility F32 on the frontier is almost
entirely a regional distribution utility, as this may have reduced comparability of the
utility with some of the firms in the sample.6 The results show a considerable
variation in efficiency scores ranging from 26% to 100%.7 The mean of the
efficiency score for all the firms in the sample is 61%. Table 12 shows the
minimum, maximum, and mean of the efficiency scores for the sample as well as the
22
individual countries. As shown in the table, the mean values of the efficiency scores
for the countries are comparable.
In the DEA-1VRS model the number of frontier firms increases from three to 15 and
the mean efficiency score increases from 61% to 79% in DEA-1VRS. The validity
of results of VRS models depends on the extent to which cost efficiency of
distribution utilities is affected by their scale of operation and whether various size
categories are sufficiently represented in the sample as lack of comparable firms
may place inefficient firms on the frontier. One concern with having a large number
of frontier firms is that of loss of information as inefficiencies of these will not be
revealed. In addition, in VRS models, the efficiency scores of firms tend to increase.
Therefore, it is important that VRS models include sufficient number of comparators
in all size categories. The DEA-1VRS scores reveal that some large and fairly
inefficient firms in DEA-1CRS move to the frontier. The magnitude of change in
some of scores indicates that while the size of the utilities in our sample cover a
wide range, some of these lack suitable comparators. Within this background we
have reason to treat the VRS scores of our data with caution.
In DEA-2CRS, the use of controllable operating expenditures as input and inclusion
of non-discretionary variables (network length and T&D losses) has a mixed effect
on efficiency scores. The scores for some utilities show considerable increase while
for others they decrease significantly. The efficient frontier is dominated by six
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firms, two of which (F32 and F57) were also on the frontier in DEA-1CRS. The
mean and minimum scores are 54% and 20% respectively and lower than in DEA-
1CRS. In addition, the efficiency scores show low correlation with the scores from
DEA-1CRS.
In DEA-2VRS, there are 21 frontier firms while the mean and minimum efficiency
scores (78% and 26%) are very similar to those of DEA-1VRS. However, the scores
show low correlation with those of the DEA-1VRS model. The results from DEA-
2CRS and DEA-2VRS underline the importance of the choice of model type and
economising the number of variables in order to limit loss of information on relative
inefficiencies of the frontier firms.
DEA-1E examines the effect of the choice of monetary conversion method on
scores. As shown in Table 8, replacing the PPP conversion rate with Euro exchange
rates has a limited effect on the efficiency scores. The minimum and mean scores for
the sample amount to 27% and 63% respectively. The scores and rank orders in
DEA-1CRS and DEA-1E show high correlations. The composition of the efficient
frontier is rather stable and the three efficient firms in DEA-1CRS model also
remain on the DEA-1E frontier.
The DEA1-OP model uses the controllable operating expenditures as the only input
variable. This specification allows examination of the effect of exclusion of capital
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expenditures on the scores as utilities with high capital expenditures may score low.
As shown in Table 8, in relation to DEA-1CRS model, the scores of some utilities in
the DEA1-OP increase while the scores of others decrease. The minimum and mean
efficiency scores in DEA1-OP are higher than in the DEA-1CRS model with 28%
and 65% respectively. At the same, the simple and rank correlations of the scores
between the DEA-1CRS and DEA1-OP models are 67% and 66% respectively.
4.2 COLS Models
Models COLS-1LL and COLS-1TL models use loglinear and translog functional
forms of the input and output variables of the initial DEA-1CRS model as specified
in Equations (4) and (5). As mentioned in previously, when the operating scale of
firms covers a wide range, the translog functional forms may not produce
statistically significant results. This is also the case here. Table 13 shows the
estimated parameters and t-values for the four regression-based models. However, as
the occurrence of the problem can be caused by the composition of the data rather
than the choice of model specification, for the purpose of comparison, we report the
results of the translog models used with COLS and SFA methods.
Table 8 shows the calculated efficiency scores of the COLS models. The mean
efficiency scores of COLS-1LL and COLS1-TL models are 60 and 63% respectively
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relative to 61% in DEA-1CRS (Table 9). Higher scores calculated in the COLS-1TL
model can be attributed to the flexibility of translog functional forms.
4.3 SFA Models
The SFA-1LL and SFA-1TL models use the same loglinear and translog variable
specifications as the COLS method. As SFA allows for statistical noise in the data,
the calculated SFA scores are somewhat higher than those of the COLS method. The
mean efficiency scores of SFA-1LL and SFA-1TL models are 62% and 72%
respectively.
The summary statistics in Table 13 show the relative importance of statistical noise
with assumed normal distribution and inefficiency in estimation of the stochastic
frontier. The sigma square σ2 is the sum of variances of statistical noise σv2 and
inefficiency σµ2. The relative importance of inefficiency is measured by gamma as γ
= σµ
2
 / (σµ2 + σv2).8 The value of gamma (99.9%) for SFA-1LL and SFA-1TL
models suggest that noise has nearly no influence in the estimated function. These
very high values of γ need be treated with caution as others have previously reported
similar unusually high values that cannot be readily explained (see for example
Coelli and Perleman, 1996).
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To summarise the results, the efficiency scores for the DEA-1CRS model show
significant changes in some scores and a relatively low correlation (0.29) with those
of the DEA-2CRS model (see Tables 8 and 10). The DEA-1CRS model’s efficiency
scores also show a high correlation (0.84) with those of COLS-1TL. This is despite
the weak significance of the estimated parameters with translog specification. The
correlation of the DEA-2CRS scores with regression-based models is relatively
weak. However, we find stronger correlation among the scores of the regression-
based models.
For example, the COLS-1LL and SFA-1LL models exhibit a correlation factor of
0.98, which indicates a rather high degree of consistency of the scores across the two
methods with translog specification. We also find a high correlation factor between
the scores of the COLS-1TL and SFA-1TL models. This shows that with consistent
specification forms, the SFA and COLS methods produce very comparable
efficiency scores. Indeed, model specification form appears to be more important for
consistency or high correlation among the scores than the moving from COLS to
SFA method.
[Table 8 here]
[Table 9 here]
[Table 10 here]
[Table 11 here]
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[Table 12 here]
[Table 13 here]
5. Conclusions and Regulatory Implications
The X-factors in price and revenue cap regulation models have significant financial
consequences for the regulated utilities. As we discussed, international
benchmarking is potentially an effective approach to setting the X-factors. However,
our results show that the choice of benchmarking techniques, model specifications,
and choice of variables can affect the efficiency scores as well as the rank order of
firms.
Our results show a strong correlation between the non-parametric base model DEA-
1CRS and the parametric COLS and SFA models. However, we found that the mean
and minimum efficiency scores in DEA-1CRS model are significantly lower than
the other two models. We also found that the DEA-1CRS efficiency scores are
significantly lower than those of DEA-1VRS and the VRS model exhibits a
somewhat weaker correlation with the latter model than with COLS and SFA
models. Although CRS scores are generally lower than those of VRS models, as we
pointed out, this is also partly due to lack of suitably comparable firms for some of
the larger utilities in the sample.
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From a regulatory point of view, substantial variations in the scores and rankings
from different methods is not reassuring. In addition, a one-to-one translation of
efficiency scores to X-factors is not justified. A practical approach in the absence of
consensus on the most appropriate technique, model specification, and variables is to
combine the results from different models. Coelli and Perleman (1999) suggest the
use of geometric means of the scores of preferred methods for each data point as this
tends to reduce the possible bias in individual models.
Our results also showed that the choice of cost conversion method (PPP vs. Euro
exchange rates) has a rather limited effect on the results. We however, found a
considerable difference in the results when using network length as proxy for capital
stocks instead of capital expenditures in a given year. Although it is preferable to
also account for depreciation and weighted average capital costs, the magnitude of
variations observed here signifies the importance of how capital costs are
represented in the models. This suggests a need for more data and investigation into
the appropriate measures of capital and capital costs in the models.
Issues to be Addressed
Utilities adapt to their regulatory framework. Benchmarking, by highlighting certain
variables, improves performance measured in terms of those variables, possibly at
the expense of other variables such as quality. Also, for the regulator, benchmarking
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involves decisions about data requirements, collection procedures, reporting formats,
and quality of supply as well as regulatory governance issues such as commitment
and transparency. Therefore, the use of cross-country benchmarking for regulatory
purpose and to derive the X-factors requires careful consideration of these issues.
Consistency of data - The reliability of and benefits from benchmarking are greatly
enhanced by continuity and consistency. This requires continuing co-operation and
commitment for collection and exchange of data between countries. Achieving co-
ordination among the regulators may be serious problem. This may because some
types of information may be readily available in some countries but difficult to
obtain in others - for instance some countries collect much better data on system
losses than others. Also the quality of the auditing process for company supplied
data may vary between countries.
Timing of rate reviews - The timing of price reviews varies across the countries and
international benchmarking inevitably leads to some dissemination of data and
results. Regulators may find the timing of rate reviews in other countries is
disruptive.  International benchmarking may therefore not be suitable for closed rate
setting practices.
Pressure to converge - A consequence of international benchmarking may be that a
given set of data shared by different regulators may be used with different methods
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and model specifications. Although many regulators enjoy full discretion with
regard to the choice of methods, models, and data, widely different uses of similar
data may be questioned and even met with legal challenges. International
benchmarking is likely to lead to pressure for convergence in use of methods and
models. It is therefore conceivable that the benchmarking practices in different
countries can gradually converge, as it may be difficult to impose different X-factors
to equally efficient utilities that operate in different countries.
Recommendations for Best Practice
If regulators were to decide it is worth co-ordinating further international
benchmarking exercises we would recommend the following. Regulators need to
agree upon long-term commitment and procedures for data collection, common
templates, and submission deadlines for data standardisation. It is important to
identify and define a minimum set of input, output, and environmental variables for
data collection. Some potentially useful additional variables are maximum demand,
transformer capacity, service area, quality of service, and voltage-based physical and
monetary breakdown of assets. The sample should also sufficiently represent
different size groups and types of utilities.
In addition, in order to reduce the effect of measurement errors and data shocks; the
data should be in the form of time-series for the recent past and then collected
annually for future years. Regulators should also discuss benchmarking models and
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functional forms such as CRS versus VRS models or consider assigning different
weights to inputs and outputs suitable for regulation of electricity distribution and
transmission utilities. The benchmarking results can also be followed up by in-depth
examination of the extent of similarities and differences between the inefficient
firms and their peers. Finally, exchange of data and experience can be facilitated by
co-operation with bodies involved in international utilities data such as the US
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Secretaría General de la Comisión
de Integración Eléctrica Regional (CIER) in Latin America, and the Australian
energy regulators.
                                                          
End Notes
1
 See Hall (2000), Comnes et al. (1995), Hill (1995), and Joskow and Schmalensee
(1986) for reviews and comparisons of different incentive regulation models.
2
 This section draws mainly on Jamasb and Pollitt (2001).
3
 See above references for detailed descriptions and various steps involved in the
technique.
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4
 There are over 200 distribution utilities in Norway. The firms used in this study
represent the largest 25 utilities.
5
 For calculations of DEA, COLS, and SFA models computer programmes EMS,
Excel, and Frontier4.1 were used respectively.
6
 However, a closer examination of the results showed that the degree of the
influence of the firm on scores of other utilities has been rather less than the other
two frontier firms.
7
 The wide range in the scores may partly be due to extraordinary levels of operating
or capital costs in the observation year. In practice, in order to increase confidence in
extreme scores, such costs for the utilities concerned in the reference year can be
compared with those of other years.
8
 See Coelli (1996) for a further description of these measures.
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Table 1:
Number of utilities in the sample
Country No.
Italy 1
Netherlands 18
Norway 25
Portugal 1
Spain 4
UK 14
Total 63
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Table 2:
Summary statistics over variables
Variables Min Max Mean
Operating costs (mill … 1.1 3430.6 160.07
Capital expenditures (mill … 0.21 1785.75 83.99
Total costs (mill. … 1.72 5216.38 244.06
Units of energy delivered (GWh) 70.123 226010 13944.11
Number of customers (000)
   • residential
   • non-residential
0.03
   0.00
   0.02
28906.55
 22553.04
   6353.51
1430.44
   1260.29
   170.16
Length of network (km)
   • overhead cables
   • underground cables
180
   0
   0
1038145
   732505
   305640
47247.91
   27969.84
   19278.03
Distribution / transmission
losses (GWh)
4.37 10651 850.12
Number of transformers 59 343833 20654.03
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Table 3:
Reference years for the data and CPI change to mid-1999
Source: OECD (1999)
Country Reference year
for data
CPI Change
(reference year to mid-
1999)
Italy 1997 3.0.%
Norway 1998 2.2%
UK 1997/98 4.1%
Portugal 1999 0.0%
Spain 1998 2.3%
Netherlands 1999 0.0%
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Table 4:
PPPs and Euro conversion rates (1999)
Source: EUROSTAT
Country Purchasing Power
Parity
(1999) 1 PPP=
Euro Conversion
Rate
(1999) 1 Euro=
Italy 1668 1936.3
Norway 9.6 8.31
UK 0.673 0.659
Portugal 127 200.48
Spain 130 166.39
Netherlands 2.04 2.20
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Table 5:
Voltage boundaries between and within T&D networks
Source: CEER survey returns
Voltage boundaries
between T & D
Voltage boundaries
within T & D
Norway T: 30-420 kV
D: 0-22 kV
(regional networks 30-132 kV)
T: 45, 66, 132, 220, 300, 420
kV
D: 0.22, 0.4, 11, 22, (132) kV
Portugal T: >110 kV
D: N9
T: VHV>110 kV
D: 45<HVN9
1 kV<MVN9
LVN9
Netherlands T: 220-380 kV
D: 110-150 kV (regional
distribution) and <50 kV
T: EHV 220-380 kV
D: HV 110-150 kV
IV 25-50 kV MV 10-20 kV
LV<10 kV
Great
Britain
T: E&WN9
ScotlandN9
D: E&W <132 kV
Scotland<132 kV
D: EHVN9
(N9DWVXEVWDWLRQV
22 kV>HV>1000 V
LV<1000 V
Italy T: N9(+9DQGSRUWLRQV
of 120-220 kV (HV) grid
D: <220 kV
D: portions of 120-220 kV
grid, 10, 15, 20 kV (MV),
and 380 V (LV)
Spain T: N9
D: <220 kV
T: EHV 400 kV, HV 220 kV
D:   36 kV+9N9
1 kV09N9/9N9
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Table 6:
Overview of methods, models, and variables
Model
1
Model
2
Model
3
Model
4
Model
5
Model
6
Model
7
Model
8
Model
9
Model
10
DEA-
1 CRS
DEA-
1VRS
DEA-
2CRS
DEA-
2VRS
COLS-
1LL
COLS-
2TL
SFA-
1LL
SFA-
2TL
DEA-
1E
DEA-
1OP
Inputs
OPEX (PPP) X X X
TOTEX (PPP) X X X X X X X
(Euro)
Network length X
T&D losses X
Non-
discretionary
inputs
Network length X
T&D losses X
Outputs
Units delivered X X X X X X X X X X
No. of
customers
X X X X X X X X X X
Network length X X X X X X X X
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Table 7:
Frequency of the use of main input and output variables used in 20
Benchmarking studies of electricity distribution utilities.
Input Output
• units sold (2) • units sold (12)
• residential  sale (6)
• non-residential sale (6)
• no. of customers • no. of customers (11)
• no. residential customers (5)
• no. non-residential customers (5)
• network size (11)
• LV lines (2)
• MV lines
• HV lines (2)
• network size (4)
• transformer capacity (11)
• MV transformer capacity
• HV transformer capacity
• transformer capacity
• no. of transformers
• service area (2) • service area (6)
• maximum demand • maximum demand (4)
• purchased power (2) • power sold to other utilities
• transmission/distribution losses (4)
• labour/wages (15)
• administrative labour
• technical labour
Cost measures:
• OPEX (7)
• OPEX+annualised standard capital costs
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• administrative/accounting costs (2)
• maintenance costs
• capital (5)
• CAPEX user cost+labour costs
• materials
Miscellaneous:
• industrial demand
• customer dispersion (2)
• share of industrial energy
• network size/customers
• % system unload
• residential/total sales
• outage
• no. residential customers/network size
• inventories
• line length*voltage
Miscellaneous:
• service reliability
• load factor
• net margin
• revenues
• distance index
• network density
• categorical variable for urban areas
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Table 8:
Efficiency scores for alternative models
DEA-
1CRS
DEA-
1VRS
DEA-
2CRS
DEA-
2VRS
COLS-
1LL
COLS-
1TL
SFA-1
LL
SFA-2
TL
DEA-
1E
DEA-
1OP
F1 60.5% 100% 70.5% 100.0% 62.1% 69.9% 68.3% 86.2% 57.2% 70.4%
F2 50.4% 85.2% 49.3% 94.1% 55.1% 59.6% 60.0% 73.1% 48.3% 51.2%
F3 43.2% 76.8% 79.1% 100.0% 46.7% 49.7% 47.7% 71.2% 39.6% 50.1%
F4 50.4% 77.5% 48.3% 75.9% 54.6% 57.9% 59.1% 67.1% 48.9% 53.5%
F5 58.1% 98.3% 56.2% 100.0% 63.8% 68.5% 69.2% 84.6% 55.5% 56.9%
F6 49.5% 70.3% 40.9% 85.7% 51.0% 55.4% 55.3% 63.1% 47.6% 43.4%
F7 34.6% 55.4% 51.8% 97.8% 36.8% 39.8% 39.9% 48.7% 32.7% 50.7%
F8 65.8% 100% 87.6% 100.0% 68.5% 73.6% 73.0% 92.5% 60.7% 76.5%
F9 58.5% 100% 87.4% 100.0% 64.1% 69.2% 69.7% 87.3% 55.6% 86.2%
F10 35.1% 48.4% 38.1% 82.7% 37.1% 39.1% 39.9% 43.7% 34.1% 42.8%
F11 54.7% 72.6% 59.1% 84.4% 52.3% 59.7% 57.7% 64.0% 53.3% 71.4%
F12 50.8% 83.0% 66.1% 96.8% 55.1% 58.8% 59.4% 72.7% 48.0% 63.8%
F13 51.7% 76.4% 51.3% 77.8% 51.5% 58.6% 57.0% 65.5% 50.3% 60.3%
F14 42.2% 49.2% 34.4% 52.2% 33.2% 44.9% 37.9% 41.8% 43.9% 68.7%
F15 61.4% 100% 42.2% 79.6% 88.7% 77.2% 89.8% 95.6% 54.7% 48.9%
F16 51.8% 71.0% 43.7% 63.5% 72.1% 58.6% 74.9% 68.2% 49.7% 75.0%
F17 67.5% 70.7% 30.1% 37.4% 66.5% 64.0% 71.3% 67.9% 64.5% 61.3%
F18 59.2% 62.3% 41.2% 45.1% 67.7% 58.1% 70.4% 64.4% 55.5% 69.2%
F19 72.5% 88.4% 23.9% 29.4% 57.9% 65.4% 64.8% 68.2% 72.5% 80.6%
F20 59.9% 62.4% 41.1% 46.2% 77.3% 62.3% 77.6% 72.1% 54.9% 56.5%
F21 53.4% 60.0% 28.7% 31.4% 54.9% 50.0% 59.3% 55.1% 53.3% 75.1%
F22 66.1% 69.0% 36.2% 38.9% 71.4% 61.7% 76.2% 69.0% 65.4% 86.8%
F23 65.6% 65.6% 49.5% 54.8% 83.1% 65.2% 84.0% 75.7% 61.4% 76.0%
F24 60.5% 83.4% 56.6% 100.0% 100.0% 71.5% 98.3% 90.6% 58.7% 82.8%
F25 100% 100% 35.1% 38.7% 91.6% 89.8% 100.0% 98.2% 100.0% 100%
F26 59.6% 68.3% 50.1% 58.3% 97.5% 69.8% 95.3% 88.3% 57.2% 70.3%
F27 81.1% 86.4% 21.5% 25.7% 54.4% 63.1% 61.1% 69.8% 81.1% 90.0%
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F28 46.1% 46.6% 24.4% 26.9% 39.7% 38.6% 43.4% 43.4% 46.1% 76.4%
F29 69.3% 71.5% 28.6% 35.6% 53.2% 56.9% 58.4% 63.4% 69.3% 90.1%
F30 49.3% 100% 48.1% 100.0% 39.8% 44.2% 34.8% 52.4% 49.3% 48.2%
F31 80.7% 100% 83.8% 100.0% 48.2% 76.6% 42.7% 86.4% 80.7% 83.9%
F32 100% 100% 100.0% 100.0% 59.0% 82.8% 51.8% 98.9% 100.0% 93.9%
F33 50.6% 52.4% 100.0% 100.0% 27.3% 46.1% 24.2% 53.9% 50.6% 100%
F34 88.1% 94.8% 100.0% 100.0% 97.4% 62.5% 86.5% 88.0% 88.1% 75.2%
F35 89.8% 92.4% 42.5% 44.8% 81.0% 74.6% 85.6% 85.9% 87.1% 96.2%
F36 71.7% 71.9% 24.9% 27.4% 60.2% 61.3% 65.6% 67.2% 70.9% 69.5%
F37 54.5% 55.1% 44.5% 51.9% 84.5% 61.8% 79.8% 78.0% 50.5% 53.9%
F38 85.6% 86.6% 43.9% 45.9% 85.5% 74.6% 88.7% 84.9% 81.0% 81.8%
F39 48.2% 48.9% 31.8% 39.4% 57.8% 45.1% 57.6% 53.2% 44.8% 47.4%
F40 62.7% 100% 46.1% 100.0% 63.3% 72.8% 70.4% 84.6% 66.7% 52.3%
F41 57.0% 61.0% 100.0% 100.0% 49.7% 56.1% 50.0% 56.9% 58.3% 60.6%
F42 65.0% 83.5% 53.2% 100.0% 93.1% 78.1% 93.8% 94.2% 73.2% 61.8%
F43 26.0% 26.3% 41.7% 62.0% 29.4% 28.5% 28.2% 32.0% 27.3% 39.1%
F44 53.5% 53.7% 96.0% 98.9% 47.5% 53.6% 47.1% 55.1% 54.6% 85.0%
F45 50.2% 95.4% 20.1% 98.1% 53.0% 51.2% 57.4% 56.8% 62.6% 58.8%
F46 67.5% 100% 51.0% 95.8% 75.9% 77.7% 81.5% 88.7% 73.2% 59.6%
F47 88.6% 100% 46.8% 96.8% 77.8% 98.2% 88.2% 96.0% 100.0% 83.1%
F48 54.7% 56.2% 61.8% 85.0% 38.8% 51.5% 38.5% 50.8% 55.5% 54.2%
F49 95.7% 99.1% 100.0% 100.0% 73.6% 89.3% 73.1% 93.0% 99.6% 100%
F50 65.8% 66.5% 66.6% 75.1% 45.4% 56.9% 47.2% 57.3% 70.9% 86.3%
F51 60.9% 92.3% 57.1% 97.3% 62.9% 66.6% 65.5% 79.2% 61.7% 49.0%
F52 49.3% 72.8% 55.7% 100.0% 46.3% 50.9% 47.5% 55.5% 49.5% 46.8%
F53 67.5% 74.2% 100.0% 100.0% 40.7% 82.6% 36.2% 80.0% 67.5% 42.8%
F54 42.6% 91.6% 52.9% 100.0% 24.0% 42.6% 22.7% 43.3% 42.6% 35.2%
F55 94.8% 100% 75.2% 100.0% 73.8% 88.5% 72.8% 95.3% 99.5% 77.9%
F56 49.3% 52.4% 83.3% 91.8% 40.5% 52.9% 38.0% 54.6% 49.6% 43.0%
F57 100% 100% 100.0% 100.0% 82.9% 100.0% 82.1% 99.7% 100.0% 84.7%
F58 49.6% 100% 29.4% 94.7% 44.7% 59.0% 51.6% 73.8% 61.9% 32.0%
F59 65.9% 88.5% 40.7% 67.7% 70.3% 71.0% 74.1% 77.8% 83.9% 45.7%
F60 44.9% 96.1% 29.0% 100.0% 41.2% 50.9% 46.7% 66.1% 54.9% 27.7%
F61 51.9% 86.1% 33.2% 78.1% 43.5% 55.9% 49.3% 59.6% 65.4% 33.2%
F62 53.4% 97.9% 32.3% 88.6% 38.8% 57.5% 45.3% 58.9% 83.2% 38.2%
F63 49.5% 100% 35.0% 100.0% 45.9% 70.4% 55.2% 99.2% 57.1% 43.0%
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Table 9:
Summary statistics of efficiency scores
DEA-
1CRS
DEA-
1VRS
DEA-
2CRS
DEA-
2VRS
COLS-
1LL
COLS-
1TL
SFA-1
LL
SFA-2
TL
DEA-
1E
DEA-
1OP
Mean
score
0.613 0.793 0.539 0.777 0.595 0.627 0.619 0.716 0.626 0.648
Std.
Error
0.021 0.024 0.030 0.033 0.024 0.018 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.024
Min.
score
0.260 0.263 0.201 0.257 0.240 0.285 0.227 0.320 0.273 0.277
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Table 10:
Efficiency score correlations
DEA-
1CRS
DEA-
1VRS
DEA-
2CRS
DEA-
2VRS
COLS-
1LL
COLS-
1TL
SFA-
1LL
SFA-
2TL
DEA-
1E
DEA-
1OP
DEA-1CRS 1.00
DEA-1VRS 0.54 1.00
DEA-2CRS 0.29 0.11 1.00
DEA-2VRS -0.09 0.41 0.62 1.00
COLS-1LL 0.61 0.35 0.04 -0.16 1.00
COLS-1TL 0.84 0.67 0.31 0.17 0.68 1.00
SFA-1LL 0.59 0.39 -0.09 -0.21 0.98 0.69 1.00
SFA-1TL 0.73 0.73 0.29 0.23 0.75 0.92 0.75 1.00
DEA-1E 0.94 0.61 0.20 0.00 0.51 0.82 0.50 0.67 1.00
DEA-1OP 0.67 0.10 0.29 -0.27 0.41 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.53 1.00
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Table 11:
Rank order correlations
DEA-
1CRS
DEA-
1VRS
DEA-
2CRS
DEA-
2VRS
COLS-
1LL
COLS-
1TL
SFA-
1LL
SFA-
2TL
DEA-
1E
DEA-
1OP
DEA-1CRS 1.00
DEA-1VRS 0.47 1.00
DEA-2CRS 0.19 0.14 1.00
DEA-2VRS -0.06 0.49 0.69 1.00
COLS-1LL 0.69 0.34 0.08 -0.12 1.00
COLS-1TL 0.84 0.66 0.27 0.19 0.75 1.00
SFA-1LL 0.63 0.37 -0.06 -0.17 0.97 0.72 1.00
SFA-1TL 0.68 0.70 0.26 0.27 0.80 0.92 0.79 1.00
DEA-1E 0.99 0.58 0.07 0.05 0.52 0.77 0.52 0.62 1.00
DEA-1OP 0.66 0.10 0.23 -0.15 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.34 0.49 1.00
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Table 12:
Summary statistics for efficiency scores – DEA-1CRS model
Min Max Mean
Sample 26.0% 100.0% 61.0%
Country 1 - - 49.5%
Country 2 - - 67.7%
Country 3 - - 50.4%
Country 4 - - 53.4%
Country 5 - - 53.1%
Country 6 - - 63.9%
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Table 13:
Estimated variable parameters and statistics for the COLS and SFA models (t
statistics in parenthesis)
COLS-
1LL
COLS-
1TL
SFA-
1LL
SFA-
   1TL
Intercept -4.498 (-15.65) -0.407 (-0.36) -5.33 (-20.5) -1.53 (-1.08)
UNIT 0.662 (9.55) 0.23 (0.40) 0.602 (11.27) 0.287 (0.547)
CUST 0.214 (5.90) 1.52 (4.01) 0.202 (7.79) 1.02 (2.15)
NETW 0.180 (1.99) -1.1 (-1.95) 0.274 (4.80) -0.718 (-1.56)
(UNIT)2 - 0.17 (1.54) - 0.176 (1.32)
(CUST)2 - 6.14 (2.8) - 6.06 (3.27)
(NETW)2 - 0.251 (2.02) - 0.456 (0.708)
UNIT*CUST - -2.95 (-0.42) - 5.4 (1.2)
UNIT*NETW - -0.277 (-1.3) - -0.318 (-1.35)
CUST*NETW - -0.168 (-1.88) - -0.192 (-2.46)
R2 0.97 0.98 - -
Log likelihood -18.8 1.03 -14.78 4.24
σ2 - - 0.208 (2.86) 0.134 (4.73)
γ - - 0.999 (98869) 0.999 (1139.7)
